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VOICE FILE NAME:  COHP (Dame Billie Miller) 
 
Key:  
  
SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
BM: Dame Billie Miller 
 
SO:  Dr Sue Onslow interviewing Dame Billie Miller at Mount Standfast, 
Barbados, on Monday, 12 January 2015.  
Dame Billie, many thanks indeed for agreeing to take part in this oral 
history of the Commonwealth project. We are particularly keen to 
capture the recollections of leading Caribbean politicians, to ensure the 
project has as broad a coverage as possible. 
 
BM: I strongly recommend you should interview former Prime Minister PJ 
Patterson, if you can.  He was one of those outstanding, committed 
Caribbean regionalists.   You always knew who they were: those who started 
CARIFTA, those who had the courage to say, “Cuba is our neighbour and 
friend”. These included Forbes Burnham in Guyana, Errol Barrow in 
Barbados, the Manleys of Jamaica; even in the OECS there were outstanding 
regionalists.  They were many of the forerunners to what became CARICOM. 
Many of the heads were deep and truly committed regionalists.  Then it came 
to a place where fewer of the heads were, I thought, true regionalists and 
even more recently, I would say PJ Patterson was the last of the true 
regionalists who believed in it and understood that it’s the only way forward 
for the Caribbean.  I observed PJ Patterson when we were putting together 
the CCJ [the Caribbean Court of Justice]. In the face of very serious 
opposition from his parliamentary colleagues, the entire Bar Association in 
Jamaica and indeed the general sentiment in Jamaica, he put regional before 
national interests.  Even to this day Jamaica is still not signed on to the 
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appellate jurisdiction of the Court. This court has two jurisdictions: the original 
jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction. The Court’s original jurisdiction has 
to do with the interpretation of the Treaty of Chaguaramas which governs the 
CARICOM. The appellate jurisdiction then had to do with our country’s 
moving away from the British Privy Council and having the CCJ as our final 
court of appeal. There were only two countries who signed on at the 
beginning, and that was Barbados and Guyana.  Trinidad and Tobago, which 
is the seat of the court, is still holding out and they still send their final appeals 
to the Privy Council. 
 
SO: How do you account for this resistance? 
 
BM: There are a lot of things which, in the Anglophone Caribbean, we still hold on 
to - which Britain has abandoned or given up, but we cherry pick.  I think it’s 
disastrous. Now in the 21st Century, I was hoping that would have been 
behind us, but it’s still there.  There are a lot of things that we hold on to. I 
remember as a young minister in 1976, while I was being introduced to the 
staff, I was told that the chief health planner, Cortez Nurse, was away on 
“home” leave.  I said to my first Permanent Secretary, who was my best ever - 
he taught me everything I needed to know about the civil service - I said, 
“Home leave?  This is 1976! Where is ‘home’?”  We were already 
independent, you know! And had been for a decade! It was more than I could 
manage.  This is what we do and maybe a few others in the Pacific and 
maybe a few small states. I’m not sure about how many now are still 
remaining from Africa who hold on to these old colonial, pre-independence 
anachronisms. What message does it send to the world? That we don’t have 
confidence in our own final Court of Appeal?  I wish that the young attorneys 
in today’s Anglophone Caribbean would become more insistent about the rest 
of the Caribbean moving to the CCJ. It is very sad.   
 
 After PJ Patterson demitted office, then Owen Arthur was seen to be his 
natural successor in the commitment to regionalism. But then he fairly quickly 
demitted office after PJ Patterson; and I have to say with enormous regret 
that I do not see, among the leaders since that time, anyone who stands out 
as a strong regionalist and who would put region sometimes before national 
interests. 
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SO: Dame Billie, is diminishing regionalism associated with the diminishing 
perception of the value of the Commonwealth? 
 
BM: Not particularly. That’s part of it, but not, I’d say, the driving part of it, or the 
most important part of it.  It is how we see ourselves now in this hemisphere 
because this is where we have our being, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Even now, it’s still a largely fractured region. I was part of a 
generation where we fought to have the ‘C’ (Caribbean) added to ‘L.A’.  Even 
now in meetings with the Latins, people have to be reminded of this. 
 
SO: Dame Billie, going back to your own particular experience: what was 
your own personal view of the value of the Commonwealth as a young 
barrister? Its perceived value as you moved into politics and then into 
political office? 
 
BM: Well, for me it was very important.  It was very important.  I like to think of 
myself as somebody who has no illusions about what was best that we held 
on to coming out of the colonial experience, and what it was important to 
jettison.  When I first came to practice in Barbados, I was the only woman at 
the private bar.  I did that for eight years before I became the first woman to 
sit in the cabinet of Barbados. In all respects there were important 
Commonwealth connections. The CPA (Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association) is one of them. Our Parliament, I think, has always been a good 
member of the CPA, even though we’ve had trouble keeping a regional CPA 
body going. This has a lot to do with leadership and commitment within the 
region as well. It also had to do with having a regional Secretariat which 
serviced little islands in differing manifestations, because in the Caribbean we 
have some bicameral legislatures like Barbados’, but some unicamerals as 
well. I am very much a voice in the wilderness for Barbados going to 
unicameral status.  Nobody’s listening to that. 
 
SO: Why are they so resistant?  One would think that it’s a natural 
progression. 
 
BM: This is my view, and our upper house is really an anachronism.  It has an 
interesting history to what used to be called the old Legislative Council, where 
the government sat in those colonial days. This is pre-independence, but I 
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thought that independence would have been just the right time to go 
unicameral.  It works beautifully in those places in the Caribbean where they 
have it. Our Senate is a deliberative chamber. There’s virtually no power. 
They can’t make a difference and we hold on to this myth that it’s a good way 
to break in young people who want to go through a political career and so on; 
and that it’s a good way to bring private sector people in and civil society to 
have representation. But you can do that in the unicameral chamber. I think 
you can do that too. But they don’t like it. They like the pomp and the 
circumstance. 
 
SO: Please, what were your perceptions of the Commonwealth when you 
came into government? 
 
BM: It was strong, very strong.  I’d lived a number of years in England and in my 
student years, my world was the Commonwealth. Throughout my political 
career, I would meet the Commonwealth at the UN or the ACP. I would meet 
it sometimes at Brussels when I went as the Minister for Foreign Trade and 
our great friend there was Glenys Kinnock, who was a MEP at that time. She 
was dedicated to the Afro-Caribbean Pacific states, but particularly the 
Caribbean, in the European Parliament. She helped and supported a lot of 
the positions we were taking in terms of trade. Then of course Richard 
Bourne, who’s a dear old friend going back, whom again I met in a 
Commonwealth connection. He encouraged me on one or two missions. The 
Commonwealth is a recurring decimal!  In fact I think this may be the third, 
possibly the fourth time the Commonwealth is examining itself and at some 
point it’s going to have to come to a conclusion! 
 
SO: It is. Rather than writing endless studies, having gathered detailed 
reports from experts, which then sit and moulder on somebody’s shelf. 
 
BM: That’s how I first met Richard (Bourne). 
 
SO: Indeed, towards the end of the 1980s when he was experiencing a sense 
of crisis in the Commonwealth, because of the issue of human rights. 
 
BM: You got it right [laughter], and we’ve been in touch since. 
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SO: Dame Billie, going back to your early political career: how beneficial did 
you feel it was for Barbados, but also for the Caribbean, having a 
Secretary General who was from the Caribbean, in terms of raising the 
profile of the region in international affairs? 
 
BM: That made a big difference because the Caribbean did close ranks behind our 
Secretary General and perhaps it’s one of the grandest things in terms of 
Commonwealth that would have happened to us in the 20th Century. Sonny is 
a regionalist; and he did give us greater prominence, although he was very 
even handed in his dealings.   
 
 The Commonwealth was a grander thing, even then.  All of the 
Commonwealth bodies, and as a student you went to High Street Ken which 
is still my favourite high street of all.  If I stop over in London I stay at the 
Hilton, High Street Ken. 
 
SO: You would come down from Durham University, specifically to go to 
High Street Ken? And to visit the Commonwealth Institute? 
 
BM: You better believe that! And now it’s no more.  I saw when it just became 
virtually derelict and now there are very spiffy 21st century-looking town 
houses going up and condominiums going up on that old location.  You would 
go to the Commonwealth Institute for all kinds of things: you’d go there for 
concerts, for talks, meetings, all kinds of things, so even at that level, as a 
poor young student, you could be involved and it meant something.  When I 
first came back (to Barbados), oh yes, the Commonwealth was important.  
You met it at almost everywhere you went. You didn’t have to be making a 
case for it. It spoke for itself. It was a force. 
 
SO: When you were first Minister of Health and Education, did you find the 
regular meetings with your Commonwealth colleagues particularly 
useful?  Had they instituted that practice in the 1980s, when you were 
Minister of Education? 
 
BM: Yes, yes. 
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SO: I’m just wondering what would be the types of discussions which would 
have emerged at these health and education ministers’ meetings: 
teacher training, content of the curriculum, university access? 
 
BM: The Commonwealth meetings were a high point in the lives of ministers of 
health and education. We were all engaged. Sometimes, these debates 
would inform the agenda of CHOGM on a regular basis. Later when I became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade I had a better appreciation of 
issues coming up from these meetings, having been there myself. Some of 
these policies which had emerged when I had been Minister, had come to 
fruition. When they come up to the CHOGM, I would have an inside view of 
their history as I’d been part of it. I had an advantage that other Foreign 
Ministers who had not been through the same Commonwealth apprenticeship 
did not have.  
 
 When I went to the Ministry of Education, it was a time when we were doing a 
lot of important things; teaching training was one of them.  The way we 
structured our schools: there was a school building program going on, we 
were doing new things in primary and secondary education, and tertiary.  
We’d just put on the ground, in my time in fact, the opening of the Barbados 
Samuel Jackman Prescod Polytechnic. Then there was the Barbados 
Community College: in my time there was a big fight going on with the 
University of the West Indies, trying to persuade them that the Community 
College should be able to offer an associate degree - we had about 23 
secondary schools at that time but just a handful had sixth forms - as an 
alternative to sixth form and a shortcut, and it took off.  It was a concept that 
former Prime Minister Sandiford, who is still alive and well, when he was the 
Minister of Education had as his big vision and it came to pass. In the 
Caribbean what we did in the latter half of the 20th Century was important 
work, putting these secondary and post-secondary institutions on the ground.  
 
SO: Was that also part of a regional approach to tertiary education, 
supported by the Commonwealth?  
 
BM: Yes, yes, very supportive.  The Commonwealth were very supportive of this, 
because we had moved away from Oxford and Cambridge as examining 
bodies.  In my day, I did Oxford and Cambridge, in the sixth form and fifth 
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forms, but now the CXC has really, really come into its own. It does great 
work. I’m very impressed. 
 
SO: So when you became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1994 in Owen 
Arthur’s cabinet, you had already had this professional, personal and 
also legislative contact with the Commonwealth in terms of your 
portfolios? There were multiple Commonwealth dimensions to your 
work? 
 
BM: Yes, even my first portfolio health. When I first came to that, as a young, 
green minister who didn’t have a clue, there was a very wonderful person 
here as the EU Delegate. He was an Englishman and his name was Mr. 
Kelly, as I remember. I said to him, ‘I have this grand idea for a network of 
polyclinics which would replace the very humble, early health centres, which 
started in my father’s time when he was Minister of Health. Mr. Kelly said, 
“There’s money still lurking about, left over from Lome 1, and you can have 
it.”  With that money we built the first polyclinic.  So even then the 
Commonwealth connection would have been as strong as the EU delegation 
connection because that was new to me. 
 
SO: How useful do you feel the Commonwealth dimension was in 
supporting the emergence of women in professions, in politics, in 
supporting work with particularly women’s issues and development, 
health…? 
 
BM: Not that strong. I wish it were stronger. I really wish it were stronger.  There 
were wonderful women that I met from all over the Commonwealth.  The 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, this is 2015. It was founded in 
1911, so it would be 114 this year. 
 
SO: You were the first woman chair of the CPA Executive committee? 
 
BM: Yes. And only woman to date. 
 
SO: “The only woman to date” – that is pretty disgraceful. 
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BM: Yes, it is.  When they were having their centennial they asked me to write a 
paper for a big coffee table type book which was going to be presented to the 
Queen and all of that kind of thing.  I spoke to it in the piece that I wrote. I was 
invited to London to speak to it at the CPA’s big Centennial and it was quite a 
thing.  There were two women in particular who were vying for the leadership. 
There might have been more but I can’t remember now. It was an election 
year.  It was the first time I can remember a Brit winning the chair of the CPA 
as well because Britain would tend to hold back and let the rest of the 
Commonwealth go forward on these issues.  One was from Tonga, I think, 
and I was speaking. I only had like 10 minutes or something like that, and 
suddenly groups of women started literally running into this room from other 
meetings, there were like three or four sessions going on at the same time.   
 
We were at a hotel in Central London - I can’t remember now what it was 
called - and the room suddenly became full, people were standing and 
apparently what happened is that somebody ran out and said, “You need to 
come and listen to this.”  Particularly because they were women now vying for 
the leadership and serious campaigning was going on. Of course I could not 
get into the campaigning but I said my piece and was really disappointed that 
no woman won.  Britain won that one.  I remember years earlier when we 
were trying to get a women’s parliamentary group within the CPA and had a 
hard time.  Again, I wanted to appear to be even handed. There were more 
than a few good men who supported it but not nearly enough. It had a difficult 
time coming into being.  I’m not so much in touch for many years now, so I 
don’t know how influential it is, but more and more women are coming to the 
parliaments of the Commonwealth but I don’t know how well they’re doing 
within the CPA.  I am not sure how the CPA is doing now. 
 
SO: How far do you see the CPA as a traditional organisation following a 
curve, rather than trying to blaze a trail and to… 
 
BM: I’m afraid so. 
 
SO: … provide showcase support for the importance of women? 
 
BM: This is it. 
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SO: The advisory board for this elite oral history project have told me, “You 
need to capture a woman’s voice. You need to make sure that you 
interview people across the Commonwealth and, yes, that has to 
capture the gender aspect as well.”  My response is, “Well, the trouble 
is in the historical period we’re looking at, few women rose to those top 
positions.” 
 
BM: Indeed, at a time when there was the Queen as head of the Commonwealth.  
In our Parliament there is no support for a quota system, not then not now. It 
is rejected in the Caribbean, except in recent times in Guyana where they 
have a proportional representation system. Here in Barbados, we’re never 
going to have a quota system in my lifetime. The attitude is, “Women on your 
own individual merit: we’ll support you, but on your own merit. No quota 
system.” 
 
SO: But there are other disincentives and other barriers to women going into 
politics. 
 
BM: Many barriers. I addressed it in that CPA centennial paper I wrote. I said, 
“First of all, you’ve got to make it into the party. You’ve got to make it into the 
politics within the politics of the party. You have to fight for the support of a 
prime minister or a party leader if you’re in opposition, a party leader anyhow; 
and you have to fight civil society. You have to fight all these things, and the 
media who are very good at trashing women’s platforms”. 
 
SO: And the other dirty politics aspect of it? That’s a personal, massive 
disincentive to… 
 
BM: I spoke to that as well.  I must give you a copy of that paper. So often have I 
approached women who I thought were interested and I mentor a lot of 
women, both here and outside of Barbados in the eastern Caribbean who are 
interested. Sometimes emails would come to me asking, “Please mentor me”. 
But once discussion started they often said to me, “I’m good at what I do. I’m 
brilliant at my career, I’m happy and I’m respected by my peers.  If it is going 
to be that as a right of passage I have to somehow negotiate the gutter 
politics, I’m sorry, I’m not willing to do this.  I have children, I have a family, I 
manage both. I don’t want to be having to explain to my sons and my 
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daughters why I have to do this.”  I would say to them, “You don’t have to take 
on the gutter politics, you make your choice.  I didn’t think that I had to do it.”  
I’ve never canvassed in rum shops. My chief canvassers will go in and do 
what they had to do, but I never felt that I had to do that.  I never felt that I had 
to make the case for myself as a woman.  I just never did.  Maybe it’s how I 
was brought up. I come from a very political family. I fought eight elections 
and the one time I lost my seat in ’86, I lost it to my first cousin who is a man 
and then I promptly won it back at the next election. I’ve got another cousin 
who represents the far left. We cover the whole spectrum! 
 
SO: Do you feel that the fact that you’re a woman was one of the 
explanations why you were not chosen as leader of the party after Owen 
Arthur? 
 
BM: No, that was personal choice.  I’ve never wanted to be. 
 
SO: I wondered. I’m aware Mia Mottley became his successor. I have read 
that she was a surprise successor, that you would have been the natural 
successor.  
 
BM: I started to mentor her from when she was 14. I’m still close to her, but I was 
never interested in the leadership. We had arrived at the point where the 
leadership succession at that time had to skip a generation. Previously, we 
had put three immediate contemporaries into the leadership one after the 
other.    
 
SO: The reason I ask that is that I had also asked Flora MacDonald why she 
had not been chosen as her party’s leader (the Progressive 
Conservatives) in 1976. 
 
BM: I remember her. 
 
SO: I’m sure you do, because you were on the CHRI Advisory Group when 
she was Chair.   She had put her failure to secure the leadership of her 
party entirely down to misogyny in Canadian politics in the 1970s.   
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BM: I never wanted it.  There was a bloodless change when Owen Arthur became 
leader of the Barbados Labour Party in opposition.  
 
SO: How far did the the US invasion of Grenada cause a crisis within the 
Barbados Labour Party?  To what extent was this not just political ill 
feeling, but personal ill feeling as well? 
 
BM: Yes, both. 
 
SO: There was also a Commonwealth dimension to this crisis. 
 
BM: Yes.  God, this is a long story! In 1970-1 I was Secretary-Treasurer of the 
Barbados Bar Association at that time, and this was the beginning that I first 
met Maurice Bishop.  People believe that we knew each other in London.  We 
happened to be in London doing our Bar finals virtually at the same time, but 
our paths never crossed.  You may recall that there was Mr Gairy and 
Maurice’s party, the New Jewel Movement. I used to be in Grenada a lot and 
saw how that emerged and so on, and became friends with them.  Then of 
course Maurice was badly beaten up. He came to Barbados for medical 
attention and as secretary of the Barbados Bar Association, I asked the 
organisation of Caribbean Bar Associations at one of its meetings, I said, “Is 
the Bar not going to have an opinion on this? Are we just going to ignore the 
fact of what’s going on in Grenada?” Not in so many words, but what was said 
to me was “You can do what you want to do, but if you come to grief, don’t 
call on us.”   
 
I got personally involved, and got very busy. I wrote letters to every 
organisation I could think of all over the world, but I was like just a one-
woman band.  Then more terrible things happened and there were serious 
cases coming down. People were being accused of treason and murder and 
manslaughter and so on, and horrible things were happening. There was a 
group of attorneys from all across the Caribbean who agreed they would go 
down to do these cases, pro-bono - only to discover that the courts start at 7 
o’clock in the morning, rather than 9 o’clock which is the usual time.  These 
things were going on and I said to the lunch table in the chambers where I 
was, (I was very political), “I’m going to go down there and I’m just going to go 
to every district court, every country court, whatever and see what’s 
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happening, see what the case notes look like”, and so on and so forth.  As 
soon as I booked my flight, a message came from Sir (Eric) Gairy to say that 
I’d better not come.  Henry Ford and Jack Dear said, “You know, we think 
your life is worth more than this.”  Then I found other ways around that. I 
found people who were prepared to do that work for me there and I just was 
relentless. I went on with it and then after a while they started to nolle pros  
[no prosecution], and in the more serious cases murder would be reduced to 
manslaughter and so on, and they didn’t pursue a lot of those prosecutions.   
 
So it was felt that I was quite close to Maurice Bishop. I was introduced to the 
New Jewel group. Then the revolution happened. I was following it very, very 
closely. It was in October and I was Minister of Education and going off to the 
annual UNESCO meeting in Paris. I remember at that cabinet meeting, I was 
leaving cabinet a little early to get to the airport and Prime Minister Adams 
caught me at the door.  He said, “Billie, a moment before you go.  We have to 
make a decision, possibly today, about where we stand as a government on 
this issue.  I know that you’re very close to Maurice. Have you got anything 
you’d like to say before you leave?”  I said, “Thank you Prime Minister, what I 
want…”  I’m getting emotional because it’s really difficult, as the youngest in 
the cabinet, the only woman in the cabinet, you know, sometimes you would 
feel very lonely.  I wish that there were more women there to give support. 
But I said to him, “Prime Minister, if this cabinet, this government was 
beleaguered in a similar fashion to which the Grenada government finds itself 
today, what would we do? Wouldn’t we look to other leaders for support?”   
 
The thing is when Maurice led the coup, he would not be persuaded to have 
an election soon after and legitimate his own government.  There are a lot of 
reasons why, but I said to the Prime Minister, “From what I know, we would 
have to move very quickly.  I believe that Maurice may be dead before the 
end of the week.”  And he was killed on the Friday. So that was a very, very 
difficult time then. Members of our cabinet went down to see in the aftermath. 
Of course Dame Eugenie (Charles) had done her appeal and so on, and the 
Americans went in. Louis Tull went down with a group from Barbados, to see 
how they then could engage.  I remember, when I came home from UNESCO 
he said, “Do you know among the documentation that I saw when I went 
down with the group after the killings and so on that Maurice reinstated you 
as persona grata?  Did you know that Sir Eric Gairy actually by written 
13 
 
document had made you persona non grata?”  I said yes I knew, but I didn’t 
know that Maurice had done this.  For a woman who works so hard for the 
Caribbean it’s amazing how I’ve been made persona non grata in three 
Caribbean countries! But that’s another long story [laughter]. 
 
SO: There were multiple reasons why you were particularly affected by this 
crisis, for regional geopolitical reasons, Barbados’ national interest, as 
well as your personal friendship with Maurice Bishop. 
 
BM: Yes, yes. 
 
SO: For other members of Tom Adam’s cabinet, was the Grenada crisis an 
equally challenging issue on how to address it? 
 
BM: It was, it was. It was very difficult to know how to deal with this because other 
offers had been made to assist.  The Venezuelans had made an offer, the 
French had made an offer, but in the end it was President Reagan who made 
a decision.  I think it was so traumatic for us in the Caribbean. We were on 
very thin ice, I’m sure, of how we would go forward; having an idea of what 
we should be doing and what we could be doing, but not sure of how to 
negotiate that. A very difficult time. 
 
SO: Well, it split CARICOM, between the Organisation of the East Caribbean 
States and the others. 
 
BM: Yes it did. 
 
SO: So as far as you recall, how long did it take for this rift to start to mend? 
 
BM: Quite a long time because we didn’t always know exactly what the Americans 
were doing in Grenada. I think the Caribbean was torn. We couldn’t be quite 
sure what was happening; it was like behind a veil in Grenada.  Then I’d seen 
so many things in politics that I thought would never happen. I lived to see it 
come full circle and saw the people of Grenada eventually make Mr Eric Gairy 
a Prime Minister again.  I couldn’t believe it was happening, but it did. 
 
SO: Was there any residual sense, that you recall, of looking to Britain?   
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BM: We did look, we did look. 
 
SO: Documents in the Thatcher Foundation archive show you didn’t receive 
a positive answer from Thatcher’s government, in the months before the 
invasion.  The British response conveys a strong sense of “this is not 
our backyard”. 
 
BM: Yes, and I think that was part of what gave rise to certain indecisions. We 
didn’t expect that. We thought that they would be the first to be in the touch. 
But that was not the case.  We have a long, long history of British war ships 
coming to our aid for all sorts of things, and this made some people unsure. 
We didn’t know how to step on this one. We were looking for guidance from 
the Commonwealth and it just wasn’t coming. 
 
SO: Yes, and of course it caused enormous problems for Sir Sonny Ramphal 
at the heads’ meeting in New Delhi, three weeks after the American 
forces went in. 
 
BM: All of that, I remember all of that, yeah. 
 
SO: You didn’t go that particular meeting, did you? 
 
BM: No I did not. 
 
SO: I was going to say, that wouldn’t have been part of your portfolio. 
 
BM: No, not then, I wasn’t the Foreign Minister then, but then we come to other 
matters.  The heads, oh the heads! 
 
SO: You became Foreign Minister in 1994. Please could you elaborate on 
“the heads, oh the heads!” 
 
BM: Well, under Owen Arthur I would say that, generally speaking, 
Commonwealth ties strengthened. We were more active in Commonwealth 
institutions, I was in CPA, Owen Arthur served on the Commonwealth 
Commission on Small States. He and Don McKinnon became very good 
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friends and remained so.  I regret that Commission on Small States initiative 
never reached its full potential, but then other things were happening in other 
institutions and in other places which were meant to be helpful for small 
states. But when you are micro-states like we are especially in the C and P, 
mostly in the oceans of the world, the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean and 
the Indian Ocean, that’ll be where we were the leaders in the SIDS. The first 
UN SIDS meeting was held in Barbados. Climate change was an increasingly 
important issue then.  We were in opposition in those years but there are 
some things that transcend partisan politics and that was one of them, and 
still remains because we are threatened and we see the leading edge of it. 
Some of the Caribbean islands are not so much islands as sand bars and 
outcroppings of rock really - in the Bahamas for instance – some of those 
have gone under already.   
 
 We were also fighting a tough, tough battle on trade. I don’t know why there is 
a divide over foreign affairs and trade.   I think I’m the longest serving Foreign 
Minister in the Commonwealth; I had foreign trade as well as part of my 
portfolio. Discussions on trade went on in foreign missions, and there were 
other negotiations going on as well, certainly in London and Brussels; so this 
seemed a natural dual arrangement. Owen and I were adamant that these 
two had to go together.  Civil Service didn’t like it, fought it tooth and nail, but 
then other people followed our lead. Canada did, and it was very difficult for 
small states always.  The most recent thing, when I was in Geneva in 
December (2014) I heard a statement from the new Secretary General of the 
World Trade Organisation, saying that he is very much in favour and that it’s 
very high on his agenda, to try and resuscitate the Doha Development 
Agenda, particularly for the LDCs. Of the ACP the Caribbean was the only 
one to actually negotiate an EPA with the ACP. But in those years when I was 
lead negotiating Minister of Foreign Trade for the Caribbean in the 
negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU and going 
to meetings often in Brussels and so on in the context of the ACP, it was still 
very, very difficult.  We tried to promote a new category of Small Vulnerable 
Economies (SVEs). The UN has a very…, how shall I say it?  It has a 
structure that does not easily admit of review and we tried to virtually invent a 
new status for countries like ours.   
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SIDS don’t cover everything, LDCs don’t cover everything, and we wanted for 
Barbados and countries like Barbados - the more developed developing 
countries - to invent this new status and they fought us tooth and nail.  We got 
there, but it’s not something that worked. SIDS was the only other thing that 
they recognised, within LDCs. People still see us as “you’re either in LDCs or 
you’re not”.  So gradations of LDCs are not really taken seriously. We are too 
few and too small.  So that statement from the Secretary General of the WTO 
is encouraging, but it is just a great pity that the small states initiative taken by 
the Commonwealth didn’t achieve our objectives. 
 
SO: So you felt this initiative ran into the sand?  I’ve also interviewed Neville 
Linton who played an important part of the drafting of the original 
report, The Vulnerability of Small States. 
 
BM: I remember him well. He was once married to my very best friend. 
 
SO: I talked to Neville about the New Delhi meeting and the emergence of 
the Small States Agenda, because of the complex and very different 
security issues that confronted small states. In the world today the 
Commonwealth presents itself as a small states organisation, but how 
effectively does the Commonwealth as an association promote the 
particular interests of small states? You’re shaking your head! 
 
BM: It has not worked well.  I remember the beginning of it, before I came to the 
CPA. I remember that the late Sir Arnott Cato, who was president of our 
Senate at that time, and Prime Minister Errol Barrow in the attempt within the 
CPA to have recognition for small states and to have a formal meeting during 
the CPA’s big annual meetings for small states – a subset for small states.  
That was a long, hard fight and even once we got it, you had to keep 
defending it every single time, every single time. We were treated like a 
nuisance. There are too many micro issues, it was felt that there were more 
important matters to be getting on with. 
 
SO: So in terms of diplomacy, to try to get recognition of the particular 
challenges facing small states … 
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BM: It’s an uphill battle all the time.  You never quite win. You’re never on strong 
footing. You’re on shifting sands, thin ice all the time. 
 
SO: Is it a question of the rigidity in the hierarchy of larger states? A 
question simply of hard power, or the UN bureaucracy which doesn’t 
want to accommodate small states?  Divisions among the small states 
themselves? Since there is a multiplicity of small states, then surely any 
united front can start to break down if there are debates about the 
points of communion. Does this then erode the force of your 
arguments? 
 
BM: Yes it does, but there was a Commonwealth component in it. For instance, 
the Pacific islands would always say ‘We are Pacific, we are peaceful. Don’t 
worry about us.’ 
 
SO: Well, that has not always been the case in Fiji, nor the Solomons, over 
the past thirty years! 
 
BM: Yes, all of them. “Don’t worry about us. Aussie looks after us.”  Aussie would 
always stand up and say, “Don’t worry about the Asia Pacific. We are looking 
after them.”  So Aussie and New Zealand are always more influential, 
because it’s their backyard, their sphere of influence. For the Pacific 
islanders, their children all go through universities there (in Australia or New 
Zealand) and so you always have to carry the battle for them.  I mean, even 
with the trade negotiations in the A, the C and the P, the Caribbean is the only 
group that actually brought something to fruition. The African members in 
East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa still cannot agree on what kind 
of economic partnership agreement they want to have.  It’s the same thing 
with (the) Pacific (group). Of the ACP group, we are the only ones who 
actually reached an economic agreement with the EU.  I was lead negotiating 
Minister for the Caribbean in the negotiations for the Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the EU, which we have squandered a lot of, I am sorry to say. 
We built in a moratorium, which would have all of us time to put our 
implementation process in place; and each island had to do it. To get 
CARICOM to do that was very difficult. A few thinking people appreciate the 
enormity of what we were able to negotiate there; and too few of the benefits 
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have been taken advantage of, because people don’t want to believe in what 
they have in their hand. 
 
SO: Does this go back to the efficacy of Caribbean diplomacy and the sense 
of regionalism, rather than having a particularly Commonwealth 
dimension to it? 
 
BM: Yes, but there was a Commonwealth component to it.  People like Glenys 
Kinnock were very helpful to us because she was our Commonwealth friend 
first, before she was our friend to the ACP, in the EU Parliament.  So she was 
kind of on a bicycle with those two wheels going at the same time. 
 
SO: So did you have any sense of having a similar friend in any way in the 
WTO negotiations?  I know that you went with Ambassador Kaliopate 
Tavola as a small states mission.   
 
BM: Again, it’s one of those many small states initiatives which you can’t see with 
the naked eye today.  Tough, tough, tough, and today, all these years later 
I’m not sure if this is something that we must continue to pursue or do what 
we’re doing now in the Caribbean, going into larger bodies and making our 
case within them.  In the ACP we were all at different stages at readying 
ourselves for this new trade relationship. 
 
SO: So it’s more of an organic, evolutionary process then of engagement, 
working from a smaller entity and moving up? 
 
BM: Yes, well, we like to think we are more moving across, rather than we are 
moving up. We would have more currency in a regional grouping or even a 
sub-hemispheric because, for instance, the Central Americans have always 
reached up to us and we have never returned that compliment.  An effort was 
made but it didn’t last very long. It didn’t last past more than one meeting of 
the heads with the Central Americans.  That allowed us to involve Cuba and 
the DR (Dominican Republic), but it fizzled out afterwards. For us, we small 
states on their own, it is very, very difficult, even at the UN. The BRICS were 
beginning to feel their strength. And so some small states have found a 
footing in larger, regional organisations which will help them to carry their 
special interests. 
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SO: In terms of the small states at the UNO in New York, how far do you 
think that the Commonwealth initiative in setting up a small states office 
close to the UNO was helpful, so that it can provide some sort of 
secretarial administrative back-up, some permanent physical presence 
for small states… 
 
BM: Helpful, but the UNO is perhaps the most resistant organisation, with all the 
power at their command. It never resonated. I am not aware of anything that 
the small states office has done. It’s the whole business of ‘smallness’. The 
same thing happened in Geneva.  The WTO at Geneva’s the same thing.  
The Commonwealth has set up a very small office to help the OECS. At first 
we would do it as individuals; for instance, when I set up a mission in Geneva 
I had to persuade my Cabinet colleagues. It was very costly to do it, but I 
persuaded Prime Minister Arthur that we didn’t have a choice. I would say to 
my Barbados ambassadors in Geneva, that when ministers came up from 
CARICOM they should treat them as though I, their minister have arrived.  
“So all courtesies are to be given, make room for meetings and so on if they 
need to do that, you do the best that you can.”  Then the OECS really wanted 
to have something a little more cohesive and that was exclusively theirs 
because they’re a subset. You see, when you get an even smaller, 
microscopic subset within small islands, it’s really very difficult for people to 
understand why we are not speaking with one Caribbean voice. This has 
dogged us all the years that I was in politics. Even today sometimes I meet 
parliamentarians that I’ve known from before and even some that are new to 
me, they say ‘your people’. As soon as I hear that, I know exactly what it 
means: the Caribbean heads will not speak with one voice. 
 
SO: I would like to ask you about the debate that went on in Cuba, at the 
fringes of the Cuba/CARICOM at the end of last year; but I’ll come on to 
that towards the end of our discussion, if I may.  Just to go back to your 
time when you were Foreign Minister with Owen Arthur: you’ve stressed 
that there was a strong Commonwealth theme to the foreign policy 
strategy of your government. Did you represent Owen Arthur at 
Commonwealth heads of government meetings, or did you accompany 
him to these meetings? 
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BM: Both. Always the Foreign Ministers accompany the Heads: to meetings of 
heads, to the UN, places like that.  I went with Owen Arthur to all 
Commonwealth CHOGMs. There were two occasions when he could not go 
to the CHOGM, and I led the Barbados delegation to Coolum, Australia and 
also to Uganda. 
 
SO: So you went with your Permanent Secretary and…? 
 
BM: No, not always.  I think it was 2000 and… it was right after 9/11 and there was 
a little recession here at the time. It was so small that people didn’t seem to 
recognise it, but Owen could not go. We were going to Sydney and then 
because of 9/11 they changed location to a very beautiful little place called 
Coolum. On that occasion there was so much else going on that I went with 
two Foreign Service officers. I had enough experience that I could manage. I 
also went to the CHOGM in Uganda in 2007 and had my Permanent 
Secretary with me there. 
 
SO: This was indicative of the importance Barbados attached to those 
biannual meetings? 
 
BM: Absolutely. It was a command performance. You had to go, because you got 
to meet your colleagues in the A and the P, to begin with. It was important 
also when we got to the UN, and other huge international meetings, 
instinctively you would have a little ACP caucus, even if only at the level of 
Foreign Ministers, or sometimes at the level of Heads. You would have a little 
breakfast caucus and find an opening to talk to each other. That was a big 
advantage because it allowed us to cover the ‘waterfront’ sometimes, in those 
little sidebar caucuses that we would have. The Commonwealth was the glue 
that brought us together. The Commonwealth was so interesting because you 
had a good OECD subset within the Commonwealth, and that gave the 
opportunity for Prime Minister Arthur to have little sidebar meetings to do with 
the way in which the OECD was giving us a really hard time about off-shore 
financing. The OECD countries were doing it themselves - the Channel 
Islands, the British too - so we had the chance to speak about non-
Commonwealth issues as well. 
 
21 
 
 So when you went to a CHOGM, you could talk to people on a wide range of 
issues beyond the agenda of the CHOGM. It was a leisurely kind of meeting 
in those days. It was the opportunity to speak to your colleagues, to push 
small states because that was always on our agenda and, in Prime Minister 
Owen Arthur’s judgment, to bring some new issues. You didn’t tend to have 
large discussion at CHOGMs on the economies of small states, the issues as 
a working economist and as a Minister of Finance, which were important for 
Prime Minister Arthur, the way in which we had to fight the OECD and that 
sort of thing. He brought that discussion to the CHOGM, looking for support. 
When I was deputizing for him at Coolum, we were in the caucus.  I don’t 
know if it was because I was a deputy Prime Minister and a foreign minister, 
but the Heads always treated me with deference and I was often, more often 
than not, invited into their caucuses in ways that my fellow foreign ministers 
were not.  When the CARICOM heads had the special meeting in St Lucia 
with Mandela, I was invited in.   
 
There was one occasion when the CARICOM Heads were having their inner 
caucus in Nevis. We were meeting at St Kitts. You always go off somewhere, 
just like the Commonwealth, to do the special ‘heads only’.  I was invited and 
in that case there was an issue which arose. I was sitting behind Owen 
Arthur, you know, and leaning forward and saying, “PM, what’s being 
proposed here, it can’t be allowed to fly”. The meeting was coming to an end 
and heads were getting up, and he suddenly put up his hand and said, 
“Excuse me, I need to make a point on this issue”.  Then he got up and he 
said to me, “Come sit here, sit here.”  I said, “Prime Minister, I cannot sit in 
your chair when you are here at the meeting!”  He said, “Do what I tell you”.  
Of course all the heads were, “Oh, what’s happening?”  He said, “She can 
speak for this. She knows all about it.  Say what you have to say.”  It had to 
do with the Dominican Republic (DR) and ACP.  
 
That I would represent Prime Minister Arthur in his absence from CHOGMs 
was not anything that people made a big thing about. It was the done thing if 
a Head could not attend, but Mr President Museveni certainly attacked me in 
Coolum.  Something I was saying and he interrupted me and he said, “You 
think you know everything, you Caribbean people!”  My colleagues came to 
my aid. I didn’t have to say a word. I can’t remember which, but one of my 
colleagues said, “Excuse me, you cannot speak to her like that.  She is one of 
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us.”  It was hysterical. Prime Minister Tony Blair was there. It was Foreign 
Minister Hunte from St Lucia who supported me.  
 
SO: Well, he was quite right to call President Museveni to account. 
 
BM: Oh dear, I’ve not had a good history with President Museveni especially when 
I chaired the Commonwealth Observation Group that went to the last 
elections. 
 
SO: In 2011? 
 
BM: Yes, yes it was, and it was fraught. 
 
SO: Did he try to stop you? 
 
BM: I don’t think so. What had happened was the Commonwealth had asked two 
former African Presidents first to lead the Commonwealth observer group, but 
they declined. That is how things get to me! I was not the first choice. Al 
Shabaab threatened the electoral process. At least one country withdrew its 
representative and, you know, “Get out of that country real fast”. I stood my 
ground and when they came back from the polls, I said to my team - there 
were 19 of us - and I said, “There is a threat, but…” 
 
SO: From Museveni’s party activists? 
 
BM: We were not sure. Long before I got to Uganda, I had started online following 
things so that I’d be up to date when I got there, apart from the briefing 
ComSec would have given me. President Museveni was bringing in some 
very costly enormous tanks, and the army reserve, right into Kampala. 
President Museveni had a meeting there, and he invited us all. I went, and we 
had to sit down for half an hour or so, before we could quietly say, ‘We have 
to be getting on with our work.’ And I think that is what Al Shabaab was after. 
They wanted to attack the army headquarters in Kampala and take as much 
of the hardware that they could. 
 
 It wasn’t at all internal Uganda issues. It was Al Shabaab next door (in 
Somalia); it was thought that they wanted to upset the electoral process, and 
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were going to blow up the final count.  They have three counts at Uganda: 
you do a count at the local level, and then you do a regional count and then 
you do the big count at the end, and this was in the garden of the hotel where 
the whole Commonwealth team was staying, the Serena Hotel in the heart of 
Kampala. (The Queen had stayed at the Serena for the 2007 CHOGM, so it 
was very, very secure). Al Jazeera was staying in the same hotel and they 
would feed some information to me as well. That is what the threat was: not 
from Museveni, but from Al Shabaab. This is what was fed through to me as 
head of mission, and I was in close touch with the British, the Americans and 
Europeans who were on the ground long, long before we arrived. They were 
very kind, and kept the Commonwealth group up to date on what was 
happening.  
 
  The whole election was a shambles, and quite an experience. None of the 
voting stations was indoors. People voted outdoors: voting booths had very 
little preparation, they might put broken branches into the ground and ribbon 
around that, and a chair as where you would vote. And it was really quite 
chaotic in some places. I called the SG, Kamalesh Sharma, who was in India 
because his mother had just died. I telephoned him and said we were safe. 
During that call, I was very conscious people were watching me; it was in an 
open public area. But a lot of our people were still out in the field, and they 
hadn’t come back yet come back to base. I reassured the SG, and said all 
precautions had been taken.  When my team came back (to Kampala) I said, 
“Well, one of our colleagues has been recalled.”  It was very cloak and 
dagger.  He couldn’t come to the hotel, all his stuff had to be taken to a 
certain place and then picked up from there, and he rushed to the airport and 
left. To my team, I said, “I’ve spoken to SG and I’m ready to proceed if you 
are”.  Not a word was spoken and then one of them, an English woman, said, 
“Well, what’s No. 1 on the agenda?  Why are we waiting?  Let’s get on with 
it.”  The Commonwealth does a wonderful thing with their observer groups, 
not in the very early years but more recently, you finish the work and you 
write your report before you leave the country. 
 
SO: Yes, and it was the speed with which you produced the observers’ 
report… 
 
24 
 
BM: Fantastic. But I felt that I had to write in that report that this election was 
neither free nor fair. 
 
SO: Billie, if I could ask, were your team members physically intimidated? 
 
BM: Not at all, not at all. I was aware, because I was head of the delegation, of the 
enormous precautions that had been taken at the CHOGM, because it had 
been held at the Serena. I was satisfied with the security there. People felt 
safe; they were reassured by the Commonwealth Secretariat out of London, 
and by the Ugandan government, and so we did our work. They simply said, 
“Let’s get on with it”. I had to call on people in Kampala of course, and some 
of our observers had to take an airplane, trains and so on to go out into the 
interior, and they had to go two days before Election Day and sleep over. I 
was three weeks in Kampala and I said to the team, “These are my cut off 
points. Beyond a certain point of danger, you come back.”  I felt very 
responsible for that. They just did what they had to do. At the end of the 
mission we were taken to the airport in one huge fleet of cars, with outriders; 
and we felt ok. But we could not say that the election was free and fair.   
 
SO: Neville Linton commented in his interview that the elections are stolen 
months before the actual polling date.  How far do you think that the 
Commonwealth observer team to the Ugandan elections arrived 
relatively late? You mention you had been there for three weeks. In 
comparison to other international election observer missions, you didn’t 
have the manpower or financial resources of, say, the Carter Foundation 
in terms of being able to get teams out to view each ward, each 
constituency. 
 
BM: Agreed. But the manipulation of the election was so transparent.  The 
Parliament had voted large sums of money for every member to fight their 
campaign.  I could not believe it. 
 
SO: So there was no attempt of concealment? 
 
BM: Then, because there was an outcry from the wider Commonwealth and even 
other countries not in the Commonwealth.  Members of the Ugandan 
Parliament tried to revoke it, and other members said, “I’m sorry, the money’s 
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spent already.”  So it was a shambles and we could see on the ground some 
of what was going on.  Of course, I spoke to opposition groups, we moved 
around and they were very nervous.  We could sense that. Now, the week we 
were still on the ground writing our report on the elections, two days later they 
were having then municipal elections.  It didn’t get past the first day, the first 
morning. It reminded me what happened in Haiti many years ago: by 10 
o’clock in the morning the whole thing fell apart. 
 
SO: With riot police in the streets… 
 
BM: People were shooting. It all had to do with money and buying of votes, and it 
was just a shambles. A shambles. That strengthened our resolve that the 
whole thing had been undermined. We were not the only observing group: 
there was the EU and some from within Africa.  
 
SO: How much do you think that your particular experience underlines the 
case for the Commonwealth to have a permanent election 
commissioner? 
 
BM: I thought that the Commonwealth should not do that immediately after the 
Ugandan election. It should look at the Commonwealth as a whole. I believe 
the Commonwealth has to think consciously, not as a kneejerk reaction: look 
at the Commonwealth, see what works well and what works best, where 
greatest need is - hard decisions may have to be made - and focus on those 
things. This is true of other organisations and activists of course; it is not just 
the Commonwealth. But the influence of the Commonwealth in many areas 
has diminished, overtaken by other organisations, by other groupings. 
 
SO: Yes, it has. It’s diminished in terms of its capacity, its resources and its 
profile. 
 
BM: But not for bad reasons.  It’s not because it failed. It had a structure to do 
certain things but it’s now been overtaken by the fact that within each 
hemisphere of the world other organisations have taken precedence and are 
doing similar work. Even in terms of the work that they do not only with 
election observation, but governance issues on the whole. International IDEA, 
of which Barbados is a founder member, is doing work on these governance 
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issues and election observation. They’re doing tremendous work that the 
Commonwealth cannot do.  Now, we belong to a Commonwealth association 
but there is a larger association which is wider than what the CPA does. The 
CPA, I think, is shrinking whereas the Inter Parliamentary Union have a wider 
range, a bigger membership, more money at their disposal because there are 
so many developed countries there, whereas what we used to call the old 
‘white’ Commonwealth, which is really the developed Commonwealth, carry 
the big load.  The Brits, Canada, Aussie and New Zealand carry all of Africa, 
all of Asia, Asia Pacific more than anything else. 
 
SO: There would be an argument for India, Singapore, Malaysia and South 
Africa to be doing much more. 
 
BM: Right, and even when we thought of moving the Commonwealth, or a part of 
the Secretariat to India. Richard struggled with that.  
 
SO: Billie, please if I could please ask you just in terms of the example of 
election monitoring mission in Uganda, and the very fact that the 
Museveni’s party effectively stole the election. The Commonwealth 
wrote a critical report which was published, and yet it was 
comprehensively ignored. 
 
BM: That’s one of the things I wanted to say. There are too many things in the 
Commonwealth that are deliberative only, like the CMAG.  It has not really 
responded to much of what has been reported by the CMAG in my time there. 
We took our remit seriously.  It turned out to be another instance where the 
Commonwealth label did not work.  The truth is, and I’ve asked myself this 
many times: if I were part of the head of Inter Parliamentary Union doing this - 
they do it, but selectively - would it have made a difference?  I don’t think so.  
I think it is the issue at hand. There is an attitude that, “We run our elections 
as we see fit. I’m not butting into that.” Old boys club here again dominating. 
 
SO: You’ve also made reference to the proliferation of other international 
bodies with their single-issue focus and agenda.  Also the climate of 
international relations has changed: when you first became active in 
politics it was the time of the Cold War. 
   
27 
 
BM: Yes, and it was still a unipolar world, but now we are living in a multipolar 
world. Very different. New diplomatic connections which are non-
Commonwealth. The English-speaking Caribbean has missions in China, 
India, the BRICS, all of the countries, Chile, Brazil; and the Commonwealth 
influence, the old friendships still work.  You feel that you could call up a 
Commonwealth colleague and say, “Look, can you be helpful with this?”  
Whatever, but it’s all below the radar. 
 
SO: Before so many of those Commonwealth networks, those education and 
social networks were formed by going to UK universities. 
 
BM: Still good, some things are.  The Commonwealth scholarship program, 
Chevening, is a big, big thing.  Right through the Caribbean for some people 
it’s on a par with the Rhodes scholarship.  
 
SO: Before the end of the Cold War, the Commonwealth had a USP in that it 
stood for democracy and development, racial justice and social justice. 
It had a clearer identity. 
   
 Billie, if I could just take you back to your view of CMAG? It was 
founded at the Auckland heads’ meeting in 1995, which you attended.   
 
BM: Yes, in fact I had to rush off from there to another meeting. So I was never 
part of the discussion about what was this CMAG going to be?’  But I 
remember that meeting quite well, yeah.   We had great hopes that it would 
make a difference. 
 
SO: Did you go down to the retreat? 
 
BM: No I didn’t, I didn’t.  I had to rush off to another meeting. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering if you remember whether there had been any 
discussion, or any prior circulation of papers for a CMAG type structure 
in the run-up to Auckland? 
 
BM:      I do not recall. 
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SO: Were you surprised by what came out of Millbrook? 
 
BM: No, there were papers and so on but we weren’t sure …, or at least I wasn’t 
sure because I’d seen the heads in so many CHOGMs give short shrift to 
things that we thought were of critical importance. I just wondered if they were 
going to take on CMAG because the heads hadn’t given sufficient remit to 
CMAG. I mean, what was the CMAG going to be? A group of foreign 
ministers?  So it’s not as though it was a subset of the heads, or a special 
committee of the heads.  They gave it short shrift from day one.  
 
SO: In terms of limiting your resources? 
 
BM: We had no resources. The whole business of following it through became 
difficult. One visit was not enough, and there were no special staff at ComSec 
whose job it was to follow through on these things.  
 
SO: So heads limited their time and attention to your recommendations? 
 
BM: Yes, we weren’t an item on the CHOGM agenda. 
 
SO: How much of CMAG’s work was deliberately, in the early years, directed 
towards military coups which primarily - not exclusively, primarily – 
concerned African countries? Was there a sense CMAG was an African 
problem solving entity? 
 
BM: Then there was Pakistan. 
 
SO: Of course there was also Fiji, and by 1999 Pakistan. 
 
BM: That’s right, but you see, remember the Commonwealth had already a history 
of disassociating people. You would be expelled from the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Yes, or suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth. 
 
BM: Or suspended, right, and there was a little hierarchy going there. It worked 
quite well, countries accepted, nobody ever said, “You go to hell. We’re out of 
the Commonwealth”. Fiji’s been in and out of the Commonwealth several 
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times and so have a few other countries.  So that seemed to be working and 
some of the heads did take the attitude, “What is this CMAG, is this some 
kind of super thing?”  They weren’t sure what the head of CMAG was 
supposed to do, and that was part of the first problem that we were not sure 
what our full remit was? The CPA would be the one, more than the CMAG, to 
help the country back to the point where it could apply for membership again.  
 
SO: The Secretary General has to take mandates from heads to carry this 
forward, and obviously CMAG was a mandate. But you describe the 
creation of this new oversight structure as a knee jerk reaction, in that 
you didn’t know particularly what you were supposed to do? 
 
BM: My take on it was that the heads were able to say, “Look, we put this thing in 
place”. They expected the CMAG to do what it was mandated to do. But the 
reality was the CMAG was never clear what its mandate was.  
 
SO: Was there a cohort of heads who really did believe in it? 
 
BM: I honestly cannot say. People didn’t want to discuss it, I found. I honestly 
cannot say, because when these issues, which were important ones, arose 
different heads would have different views about it, various regions within the 
Commonwealth would have different views about it.  I’m trying to think if I can 
recall an issue.  It was difficult because in a region if a country went crook, 
then sometimes the region would call around about that country to defend its 
position, or sometimes it would be a stand-off and the heads were rarely ad 
idem on any issue that arose on CMAG’s agenda. 
 
SO: Okay. Was that also, in part, a product of the chairmanship of CMAG 
under Stan Mudenge?  
 
BM: I was uncomfortable about that from the get-go. I thought ‘There’s money 
being spent.’  Not that we were given a separate budget. But from the very 
first meeting, I remember feeling “We’re not going anywhere with this.  We’re 
not making a difference.” 
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SO: I know that, for instance, President Sani Abacha wouldn’t even let 
CMAG into Nigeria despite repeated appeals that you be allowed to 
enter the country. 
 
BM: Yes, yeah. The more spectacular, I remember, was Pakistan after Musharraf 
led a coup. Like with Maurice Bishop, you know, we were trying to say to him, 
“Look, you need to legitimate this coup. You need to have elections and just 
get back on course because the Commonwealth has a position on these 
things, you know.  If you’re going to be expelled, it wouldn’t be the first or last 
time.”  It was clear to me. I went on that mission; it was just a group of about 
five. The foreign minister of Canada, who subsequently went back to 
academia. 
 
SO: Lloyd Axworthy. 
 
BM: That’s right, a great friend.  He said, “I’ll give you a lift”. We flew out of Ottawa 
on this great big 747 with like 12 of us just rattling around in it, and we went 
first to an airfield in Oxfordshire that was used during WW2; and then 
somebody was coming over from Bangladesh and from somewhere in West 
Africa, I think, to join us.  In the end somebody didn’t turn up. The security 
was very tight in Pakistan. I’ve never seen the like of it anywhere. Musharraf 
was in full military uniform. He received us in a very civil manner; we met with 
him once, twice, and he was promising that he would hold elections and that 
he was going to start at the municipal level, and a lot of talk. This meant he 
was going to entrench himself more and more, without a Parliament. I told my 
colleagues, who included Robin Cook, that it was clear that Musharraf was 
not going to do anything. The British High Commission there and the US 
Embassy were in lockdown. Even in Haiti, under house arrest, I never felt so 
closed in upon. I think it’s just the feeling not only among some heads, but 
right through the hierarchy of the Commonwealth it was felt that we had a 
system in place and somehow CMAG did not seem to fit well into it. There 
were other organs of Commonwealth governments which would have dealt 
with outbreaks and coups, and issues like that in the past. 
 
SO: Such as what?   
 
31 
 
BM: The CPA, and the heads themselves, who would be advised by the Secretary 
General. But they would do it individually. They would talk to each other and, 
you know, it was the ‘old boys’ network. 
 
SO: The informal network, using the informality of the Commonwealth? 
 
BM: Thank you. That was my take on it. That was how I felt for all the time that I 
was on the CMAG. 
 
SO: So this Commonwealth venture into a more formal structure, with the 
setting up of CMAG… 
 
BM: You never hear about it. It’s so far below the radar that people don’t even 
know if it still exists.  You don’t see any reports so you don’t know what it’s 
doing.  I don’t know when last it made a report, but I never felt that any report 
that we put before the heads was taken seriously enough.  It never excited 
any discussion at the table. 
 
SO: Please could I ask you: how did it operate? When CMAG – and you were 
of course vice chair - got together in the early years, was there a degree 
of an informal agenda, or that there was the informality of a lunch and 
then you went into the formal meeting? 
 
BM: No, there was serious discussion. The agenda was quite formal and when we 
had my friend from Botswana in the chair, he was a former general … He was 
very firm, a good chair, and when I demitting the CMAG he made a little 
speech.  He said, “She’s worth four men.”  I thought, “Please let the floor 
open up and take me away!”  Again, I was the only woman and in that 
particular arena and you couldn’t forget that you were the only woman there.  
In most of my political life, it didn’t make a big, big difference but in the CMAG 
you were dealing with coups, counter-coups and all of this kind of thing, 
where people have really blotted their copybook badly in the Commonwealth.  
One or two of the countries of the Commonwealth which were a little suspect, 
hadn’t come before the CMAG but had become members of the CMAG. That 
was very undermining, I think, to a large extent.  All reporting back was to the 
Secretary General, who would communicate with Heads.  
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SO: How much also was it that members of CMAG were looking to their 
regional responsibilities and not necessarily to their Commonwealth 
responsibilities?  So, for instance, when Ghana was arguing particularly 
on Nigeria, whether Sri Lanka was arguing particularly on the case for 
Pakistan? 
 
BM: Some of that too, some of that too. That is why I thought rotation on CMAG 
was important. I became much disheartened when certain countries would 
find their way on to CMAG. 
 
SO: How were they selected? 
 
BM: Again, the heads in their caucus, and on another occasion would just declare 
it.  Obviously they would have been talking very closely with the SG and so 
on. We normally met in London. I don’t know how Barbados got on to the first 
CMAG.  I can’t think of anything that would qualify Barbados rather than any 
other country in the Caribbean.  So it was difficult to tell.  I suppose I was 
Foreign Minister with a certain amount of experience at the time, but I was still 
a fairly young foreign minister so I don’t know. 
 
SO: Was there any appreciable shift, as far as you could see, in terms of 
CMAG’s organisation and approach, or remit, drive and energy when 
Don McKinnon became Secretary General? 
 
BM: Yes, yes, much more structured. 
 
SO: Because he had, of course, been on CMAG since 1995. 
 
BM: Yes, much more structured, but at the end of the day, you know, I’m very 
much one for outcomes.  You can spend your whole life working very hard 
with much output, but at the end of the day what is the outcome?  You spent 
all of your energy on output, but the outcome which would have been your 
original remit, did it materialise? I think that CMAG was weak on outcome. 
 
SO: Were you part of any discussion on whether CMAG should be having a 
wider remit beyond addressing military coups? 
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BM: Oh yes… All of those things were looked at, but we would always then come 
back to butt up on - this is a Barbadian phrase! We would always come back 
to the fact that there’s quite a large conservative element, as you would know, 
in the Commonwealth.  But we already manage these things, people were 
saying, ‘People have a coup and they’re exiled’ and it is true because I was 
part of that when I was on the CMAG too.  You would be working - and in 
CPA, we did a lot of work in CPA - you would be working under the radar 
preparing… like with Nigeria, or any other country; or Fiji for that matter. 
When you’re expelled for several years and you come back, you don’t have 
an election and a parliament just like that. The CPA would have been working 
below the radar all the while, readying people, training prospective clerks at 
the table and so on, and getting a country’s electoral body into a state of 
readiness and being really psychic sometimes, you know. “Can we start to do 
this yet because we don’t want to upset this very delicate situation? We don’t 
want to excite people into thinking that we are managing things behind the 
scenes”, and so on.  So, several Commonwealth entities would be working 
together to ready countries for re-entry to full membership of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Yes, the CPA, the Commonwealth Local Government Association, the 
Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association. 
 
BM: Everybody would be doing their thing, and the ComSec would be like the 
puppeteer there. It worked for these entities. What is CMAG’s remit? We kept 
asking ourselves that over and over again.  The only remit we had was to 
produce a report which went to the heads. (And the heads met only every 2 
years.) 
 
SO: Which was not published. 
 
BM: No, and it was not an agenda item. It was something that the heads were 
expected to be discussing when they went into caucus, where we were not.  
Nothing ever came back to us and nothing happened, at least not that I am 
aware. 
 
SO: What did you think of Farooq Sobhan’s idea when he was a candidate 
for the SG-ship, in the run up to the Durban heads of government 
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meeting in 1999? He argued CMAG should be reformed, but that its 
remit should be expanded - not simply that it should address military 
challenges to democracy, but that there should be other critical 
challenges to states, such as the environment, which CMAG should 
have the licence to bring… 
 
BM: We supported that. Those of us who were on the CMAG supported that. But 
the heads did not. 
 
SO: Had Farooq Sobhan been in discussion with you about these ideas? 
 
BM: No, not to my remembrance. He might have talked to the chair, I don’t know. I 
don’t remember.  I don’t remember that there was any open discussion but 
we did have some on the CMAG who felt that perhaps if we had a larger remit 
that somehow we would get more attention, but we always came back to that 
element which felt this is not… you know, this would be sort of okay in one-
on-ones and so on, you would hear this, if the machinery that the 
Commonwealth has to deal with these difficult, prickly issues which don’t fall 
into any particular box works.  
 
SO: How much do you feel, Billie, it was also a product of the fact that by the 
end of the 1990s the Commonwealth had become too large? 
 
BM: Well that’s another problem, because there were some heads who began to 
wonder how did Mozambique get into the Commonwealth? 
 
SO: Indeed.  I can see a certain logic of Mozambique’s membership, in terms 
of being a critical Front Line state in the struggle against white minority 
rule in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and Apartheid in South Africa, and it was 
part of the SADC region; so there was a sense of Commonwealth 
engagement and regional common practice with Mozambique dating 
back to 1975.  But Cameroon?  
 
BM: This is it: Cameroon? These were countries that would have gone straight to 
CMAG’s agenda. There was, I think, a little bit of a feeling - I’m going back in 
my memory now - that the Commonwealth was even then re-looking its 
direction and at the same time, you know, it was beginning to bulge out here 
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and take on something there. It was not structured.  The Commonwealth 
started doing things and beginning to think about doing things without a big 
picture. I’m a big picture person.  There are people in this life, and the 
majority of people I believe who focus well, they have an area of interest and 
influence and they focus well there, but if I can’t see the big picture into which 
I fit, I have difficulty.   I saw this, like Topsy, just grew and grew and growing, 
and at the same time we were asking where is the sense of direction for the 
21st Century for the Commonwealth? 
 
SO: Yes, but that was part of the on-going discussion - just as there had 
been a High Level Appraisal Review group at the end of the 1980s and 
1990 on the Commonwealth and the role of the Secretariat. It was the 
same energy and commitment that Don McKinnon brought to the 
Commonwealth, to give it an express sense of purpose and direction 
that tried to take the Commonwealth towards being more of a trade 
association. 
 
BM: They were the two, Chief Emeka and Don McKinnon, I think, of the most 
memorable SGs, although nobody will remember SGs today.  The 
Commonwealth still had not come to a clear decision on where its place in the 
world was going to be, what its major influence could be in a new multipolar 
21st century world.  Yet still it was wanting to go off in these apparently new 
directions. 
 
SO: How much of it was also, in your view, associated with the reduction of 
time for heads’ meetings? That the time devoted to their meetings, the 
executive sessions and the retreat, was getting shorter and shorter?   
 
BM: Yes but that was true generally speaking, for all kinds of meetings, CARICOM 
meetings, all kinds of meetings.  I remember when it was a big event, on the 
first day you relaxed and you had a big ‘do’ in the evening and so on and then 
I was one of those who said, “No, no, no, no meetings that I’m chairing will 
happen like this again.  You come on the evening before, and that is when we 
have the opening session, and your cocktails will come after that, but we start 
work at 9 o’clock the next morning.  I want a full day’s work. I have chaired 
meetings, I’ve been invited to a meeting just to chair the meeting. Dame Elsie 
Payne taught me this, the first Barbados woman scholar, and she said to me 
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one day (she sat on the University of the West Indies’ Council for years). I 
was already in the Cabinet, and she said to me, “The hallmark of a good chair 
is that a good chair must bring a meeting to resolution.  Preferably a good 
resolution, but it must come to some resolution.”  So when I chair everybody 
knows my style.  Decisions in the minutes must be in bold so that at a glance 
we know if we have achieved anything at all. But I must bring the agenda to 
resolution. It doesn’t mean that things don’t get postponed to another 
meeting.  If you can’t get a quorum, you have a non-meeting. There was a 
feeling that the Commonwealth was getting too diffuse at a certain point, I 
remember that.  Despite all of these attempts, and I think there were four that 
I can remember in my time, the Commonwealth looking at itself and 
everybody was looking towards the 21st century; the new technology was 
already making its presence felt. ComSec was very slow to come to that but 
then so were most organisations.  It was almost… not quite a collision course, 
but running on two separate channels.  I couldn’t see how they were going to 
converge in the end. 
 
SO: So is it precisely because it is such a diverse organisation that its 
energies were starting to dissipate?  
 
BM: Yeah, reaching into too many things, thinking it could be all things to all 
people.  It never was and it never was meant to be, I don’t think, but not 
sufficiently recognising that perhaps there were smart partnerships that the 
Commonwealth could have forged; but it saw itself as so exclusive in the 
English-speaking world.  You know, there was a time when the 
Commonwealth did have that structure but that was diminishing.  People were 
looking to other organisations. 
 
SO: Billie, please if I could ask: how much was it also that the 
Commonwealth, in terms of its structure, was also changing, just as 
there was a rising role for civil society organisations and the role of the 
rights based discourse? 
 
BM: I am with you.  I said to you just now that perhaps the Commonwealth could 
have reached out more to form smart partnerships, that is exactly what I 
mean: with civil society organisations.  That is what I spend a lot of my non-
government life doing, even now that’s what I’m doing in the organisations 
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with which I am associated. I tried to hammer this home when I addressed the 
graduation last year at the Cave Hill Campus of the UWI, governments can’t 
be everything to all people. There are things, all sorts of things that civil 
society is motivated to do and wants to do and can do better than 
governments, precisely because they’re the people at the barricades where 
governments often cannot go; especially for small states like ours, we need to 
form these smart partnerships.   
 
A perfect example: when I retired I said I wasn’t going to chair anything again.  
I’d had enough of that for thirty two years in public life.   I’m deputy president 
of the Barbados Association for Retired Persons. It’s the biggest NGO in 
Barbados, 43,000 and growing because we’re in an ageing society now.  
Everybody expects BARP, as it is called, to be all things to all people.  We 
want this and we want that, and we want a big fancy headquarters and we 
want tennis courts and a running track and a gym.  We can’t afford it!  You 
pay $5 a month to belong.  You can’t afford it.  What we needed to do was to 
form… and it took me years and an excellent chair now, first class man, with 
an HR background, (to say) you’re not going to try to duplicate all of that. You 
are not going to be able to afford it on your $5 a month, but we can form 
smart partnerships.  So the Heart and Stroke Foundation give us special 
access to their gym for those with heart disease, the Diabetes Foundation 
likewise. We now have our own credit card and so on and so forth; and this is 
how we raise money for other programmes. So with an organisation like the 
Commonwealth, when it was perfectly aware that certain influences were 
diminishing and so on, and that it had to look to re-set itself within the 
international community, that might have been a time to force smart 
partnerships. 
 
SO: Is it fair to say, though, that the idea of forming smart partnerships is 
also running into governmental resistance to reaching out to NGOs, 
precisely because there is a perception and dislike of NGOs because 
they are unelected organisations? Also, rightly or wrongly, civil society 
organisations are associated with a human rights discourse?  So then 
they can be problematic: that there is not necessarily a constructive 
tension between governments and civil society, precisely because civil 
society groups push more for economic, social, human rights, which 
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may not accord to government ideas of what developmental states can 
recognise or permit. 
 
BM: If that was the challenge then I think that the Commonwealth could have 
attempted it.  I’m one who believes that they could have attempted it.  It has a 
good track record on a whole range of matters, and in a manner of speaking 
the Commonwealth is civil society as well.  In fact it’s a hybrid, where there’s 
huge government input; but in effect the Commonwealth does attempt to do a 
lot of things that governments by themselves either are not disposed to do, or 
don’t do, or can’t do. 
 
SO: Billie, please can I ask you about your experience on the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative? You were a member of the 
advisor group for the CHRI. You said earlier that this is how you first 
met Richard Bourne, when the Commonwealth seemed to be 
languishing in the 1980s. 
 
BM: Yeah, I think that was when I first met Richard.  I can’t remember exactly and 
I don’t know what his memory of the first meeting is, but I think that was the 
first time. 
 
SO: There was a crisis seminar in Windsor Great Park when he was saying, 
“The Commonwealth is dying. We need to re-energise it.” 
 
BM: This is it! I can remember the bedroom I slept in at Windsor Great Park 
because they said this was the bedroom of one of Queen Victoria’s 
daughters. 
  
SO: This was an initiative by Commonwealth activists, the committed and 
well connected with very good networks, individual journalists, lawyers, 
etc., able to draw upon that pool of human knowledge that exists within 
the Commonwealth, rather than having express endorsement from 
individual governments? 
 
BM: Well, it didn’t work as well as we thought! 
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SO: No?  But hasn’t CHRI achieved modest successes? It established its 
office in New Delhi by 1993. It does publish regular reports. 
 
BM: But who knows?  This is the thing.  I mean, nobody has said to me or has 
emailed me to say, “Would you like to come onto our subscription list? Would 
you like to have the newsletter?”  There’re so many that I get and that I do 
read, but nothing out of the Commonwealth in that way. 
 
SO: In part it could be said there’s been a proliferation of news sources and 
now a radically different news agenda. Whereas before the 
Commonwealth was able to have its links to particularly well informed 
journalists and its clear, critical stance – e.g. against apartheid South 
Africa. But that era has now gone. The information age is now 24/7 and 
so there’s a very different media landscape. It’s also difficult for the 
Commonwealth if it hasn’t got an attractive news story - that makes it a 
considerable challenge to get the message out.  Patsy Robinson talked 
about this at the Witness Seminar on the Commonwealth Secretariat.  
She said when the Commonwealth and the Secretariat were opposing 
apartheid in South Africa this was a “sexy story”: that there were media 
people banging on ComSec’s door saying, “What does the 
Commonwealth think and do about this?” 
 
BM: I remember that time, when people did want to hear what the 
Commonwealth’s opinion was because it covered the whole spectrum of 
governments.  You had the first world countries, third world, everybody had a 
voice within the Commonwealth.  Some were louder than others but people 
respected and wanted to hear what the Commonwealth had to say. Nobody 
has asked that question now for a long, long time.  People actually ask me 
“what is the Commonwealth?” 
 
SO: I’m asked that frequently in England.  People say, “The British 
Commonwealth? Didn’t that die in 1949?”  My answer is “Well, no, and 
it’s not the British Commonwealth…” 
 
BM: This is it, and there is this view that when Queen Elizabeth either abdicates or 
dies that the Commonwealth is going to die with her. And now that we see 
royals going to New York and Las Vegas and countries that are not 
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Commonwealth, the view is that the 21st century Commonwealth has not 
started to transmogrify enough.  People have no idea what it could look like in 
the 21st century, and we’re there. 
 
SO: What is your assessment of the value and the contribution the Queen 
has played as head of the Commonwealth, to the association? 
 
BM: She is the lynchpin. It’s her. It’s who she is, and she is faithful to that. 
 
SO: So it is a combination of her charisma, her longevity in office, the 
hospitality that she provides? 
 
BM: Everything.  Everything, and she’s done it as long as she could manage it. I 
can remember going to a heads of government in Coolum. That was when 
she said, “No more. It’s too much for Philip and it’s getting too much.  Just 
something on the lawn and we’re not going down in the flower forest and 
gullies. We can’t do it anymore.” Physically they were not able to do it 
anymore.  When it was at its most brilliant, she was the centre of it. She 
epitomises the association. The Commonwealth is the Queen and this is part 
of the argument of countries like mine who are independent but remain in the 
Commonwealth. There are some who don’t understand how that works. I’m a 
Republican, I have to say again, one lone voice in the wilderness, I don’t think 
it’s going to happen in my lifetime, but the Commonwealth has republics 
within it.  Even her role is a diminishing one - not in her heart, not in how she 
views what her life’s work is, but simply because as she grows older, she 
can’t carry that load that she used to do.  I think some of the young royals are 
into other things, and interesting things in my view.  
 
 There is no particular reason why the Commonwealth should resonate now 
with younger generations.  
 
SO: In terms of the headship: I’ve heard ideas being mooted in London that 
rather than Prince Charles (who represented his mother at the Sri Lanka 
meeting) as the next Head, whether it should instead be the Duke of 
Cambridge; and that he and his wife, as a young family, should live in 
individual Commonwealth countries, to give a greater sense of unity 
and cohesion to the association. 
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BM: I don’t think that’s going to work. No, no, with respect to the royal family, if 
you’re going to continue to have a monarch they need to be living in Britain, I 
would think. 
 
SO: Was there much discussion when you were active in politics on whether 
there should be an elected Head of the Commonwealth after the Queen? 
Or if, because there is a Secretary General, it’s not needed? 
 
BM: Never heard the discussion.  The Queen is a monumental head. 
 
SO: She embodies the organisation? 
 
BM: Yes, I’ve never heard that discussion.  I have never participated or heard of 
that discussion.  The discussions that I’ve heard more have to do with the role 
and function of the various institutions within the Commonwealth, some of 
which were withering away, some of which were not so much withering away 
as being overtaken by other entities.  The old developed world 
Commonwealth now has a different geopolitical focus. Canada is Asia Pacific.  
Even before the United States recognised that they were really Asia Pacific 
as well, anything that touches the Pacific Ocean like Chile, Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and the Western Hemisphere as we know it, these two great 
continents are Asia Pacific.  The influence coming across the Atlantic is very 
much weakened. Now even the ACP is becoming doubtful about the future 
because if Europe transmogrifies into something that is not willing to have 
that appendage, and I would understand if they don’t, then we are 
insignificant. We lost our opportunity when we tried to put together, in this 
hemisphere, something which we were calling the CBTPA; it was really a 
trade initiative and we were thinking that this was President Clinton’s grand 
moment. 
  
SO: The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act?  
 
BM: It went to hell in a basket. The BRICS were then rising and those like Chile 
and Brazil were saying to the United States, “We’re sorry, this is really trade 
that we’re talking about and if you continue to be protective of your industries 
and your agriculture and so on, it really does not lie in your mouth to tell us 
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that we are not to do likewise.” And it broke down there.  Then in the wider 
WTO setting, the BRICS really went up on their hind legs, showing their 
strength.  It always faltered on that, that the developed countries wanted to 
have it every which way. It’s still simply their way and they still wanted…, you 
know, you either have free trade, or you don’t have it and they were still very 
protective. The OECD when they were hammering poor little Barbados into 
the ground on the offshore sector there was one country in the Pacific, I forget 
which of the islands, of which they were saying, “You have a financial 
services sector and you are doing naughty things under the table”, and so on.  
I forget who it was at the time. It may have been PNG. That state replied, “We 
don’t have such a sector in our economy.”  Of course, they were hammering 
us in Barbados too and we had to fight back and it was costly. 
 
SO: Don McKinnon talked about this. He said that he was incensed that the 
OECD bureaucrats as non-elective officials were telling sovereign 
governments what they could and couldn’t do. 
 
BM: Yes, yes, while they were doing it at the same time.  Europe was doing it, the 
Brits were doing it too! Switzerland is well-known; even in recent times the 
courts have said, “We’ll allow a certain amount of exchange of information”, 
but maybe it’s more talk than anything else, because in that arena, the 
Commonwealth could not help us because some of the Commonwealth 
countries, the better off Commonwealth countries, became our not-friend, put 
it that way. The OECD was doing what they claimed that we were doing, in 
the Channel Islands and elsewhere, in Cayman, in Anguilla, the Turks and 
Caicos which are still territories.  So it was difficult to point the finger. 
 
SO: Indeed.  Billie, in your view how much of the viability and the visibility of 
the Commonwealth is associated with the persona of the Secretary 
General?  You made the comment at the start of this interview on the 
fact that Sir Sonny Ramphal is from the Caribbean region was 
enormously helpful.   
 
BM: Yes, and the Caribbean felt that he would always be on our side, irrespective 
of the issue. 
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SO: Yes, what was your view of the qualities of Chief Emeka and Don 
McKinnon as Secretary General? 
 
BM: Well, these were powerful men.  They were the last great SGs.  It was in my 
time when I was a Foreign Minister and therefore I had a lot of access and I 
could see them literally growing into their jobs and really defining the 
Commonwealth at a time when the Commonwealth was looking for definition.  
But again, you began to see then where Heads couldn’t find common ground 
and sometimes had problems with the SG, and the SG is the one who is 
going to be drafting the agenda. But we began to see those little divisions and 
in the Chief’s book (An Inside History of the Modern Commonwealth) he does 
make reference to some of that which we first saw… well, I first saw it on his 
watch. 
 
 What’s happening now (on the rival candidates from the Caribbean) is just so 
horrible for the Caribbean. It is thought to be the Caribbean’s “turn” so to 
speak, if there’s such a thing.  I’ve never had a lot of respect for that business 
of a “turn”. You’re looking for the best person for the job, but I think part of 
what is going on now has to do with the fact that the Commonwealth on the 
whole is grappling with the fact that a lot of its original influence - I wouldn’t 
say ‘power’ but certainly ‘influence’ - is diminishing, and more rapidly now.  
It’s a pity what’s happening now because there’s this terrible fight going on 
about who is best suited to be the next Secretary General. I don’t know that 
it’s going to make any real difference. Are the Commonwealth heads going to 
be paying much attention to who is the next SG? 
 
SO: How would you explain the emergence of the three rival candidates from 
the Caribbean and the intensity of the rift that it opened up at the 
periphery of the November Cuba/CARICOM meeting? 
 
BM: We have this all the time.  We’ve had this as far back as I can remember.  I 
know what it is to be awakened by Sir Shridath in a meeting where we were 
fighting for a certain position and he said, at 3 o’clock in the morning “You 
need to know X country has just sold out to Y country.  We have to start doing 
some serious, serious lobbying at 7 o’clock tomorrow morning.”  Not new, not 
new. The Caribbean has great difficulty speaking with one voice. It is an age 
old complaint. 
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 Just among the Anglophone Caribbean; and we know how powerful we are in 
our hemisphere when we speak with one voice.  We are 15 countries in 34 in 
this region, not counting Cuba of course, but one hopes soon to do so.  So if 
you want to be head of any institution in the Western hemisphere you have to 
aim to get all or the majority of the Caribbean vote.  If you want to be head of 
PAHO [Pan American Health Organisation], if you want to be head of any of 
the inter-American agencies. 
 
SO: Is it in part a problem of national political culture?  Do people in power 
talk to people in the opposition?  I know that that is not necessarily the 
case in Commonwealth African countries, but I’m trying to think why is 
it that there is such a feisty, national determination for an individual 
voice. 
 
BM: Well, there are a lot of very big fish in very small seas, and it’s sometimes 
easier I think to help inflate - I’ve got to be careful what word I use here – 
“egos”, how people see themselves, how people see their countries.  
Sometimes it’s not necessarily an ego thing in terms of the person, as much 
as the country.  ‘My country’s a little country and I have to fight to keep its 
nose above the water’.  Again, the old boys’ club works there and sometimes 
it’s in countries where the economies are very tiny, very fragile and they reach 
out to other countries. It’s been difficult for small states like ours to get away 
from something which the Commonwealth helped to engender at its early 
stages: “We’re here to help you. We’re here to give you special and 
differential treatment.”  Then when you become more and more independent 
then, you know, there has to come a time when you’ve got to stand on your 
feet.  We’ve had three, four Lome. There’ll be no more Lomes. “This should 
have taken you to a place where you can fend for yourself…” But it doesn’t 
and it’s too easy to fracture.  Even where we have tried to go to the greater 
Caribbean, the wider Caribbean, for example, the Dominican Republic, or 
Haiti, it’s not been very successful. 
 
SO: As my last question: what do you think about the future of the 
Commonwealth?  Do you see it as a viable association?  Do you think it 
needs to shrink so that it becomes more effective? 
 
45 
 
BM: I don’t think it’s viable as it is. I think that there are things which are still 
working well for the Commonwealth, they have to be brutally honest about 
what the reality is and what is viable in the early 21st century, and seeing 
where things are, the direction in which people are going now.  I don’t know 
how well the Commonwealth would survive in a multipolar world. 
 
SO: Because it doesn’t have sufficient definition, a sufficiently clear sense 
of purpose? 
 
BM: In the unipolar world, you know, it had a centre which was holding but the 
centre is not holding now because people are looking beyond the 
Commonwealth to other non-Commonwealth capitals.  I can remember as a 
young parliamentarian in legal matters, even when I was Secretary-Treasurer 
of the Barbados Bar Association, in legal matters you’re looking for 
precedents. We used to look to Canada, to Sri Lanka in those days.  
Nobody’s looking to Sri Lanka, I think, much nowadays.  Australia and New 
Zealand, of course.  Then you were looking for training. We have never had 
really a proper diplomatic training centre in the Caribbean.  At the UWI 
campus in Trinidad, there is a programme but it never worked well and then 
we heard that Jamaica was going to have its own diplomatic training centre 
and Guyana was going to, but I’ve never heard further.  So certainly in my 13-
14 years as Foreign Minister of Barbados we always had to depend on 
Commonwealth countries. We would get a training opportunities in Australia 
from time to time.  The one in Trinidad would do annual courses and we had 
such a small Foreign Service division, you know, we always get the shorter 
shrift.  We could not afford to send an officer every year for a year.   We 
asked for some short term three or six month attachments but they could not 
accommodate our requests. Australia used to offer a lot of good training:  for 
chief of protocol you would send officers there.  New Zealand would 
sometimes do other things, the Canadians would do other things in other 
sectors of the economy and they do great courses and attachments in 
parliamentary matters.  We don’t so much look to Westminster now. 
 
SO: You look to Canada? 
 
BM: To Canada because of its modern legal precedents, parliamentary practices 
and international financial and economic systems that are more relevant and 
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attractive to us. It is a major market for Barbados. I am deputy chair of the 
Electoral Boundaries Commission of Barbados, and every year in September 
there is a course that’s offered, but it is not by the Commonwealth. It’s an 
independent organisation which looks to electoral and boundary matters. One 
day I asked if there was a Commonwealth equivalent and was told no. So 
within the Commonwealth there’s a sea change going on. 
 
SO: How much do you think the creation and signing the Charter has been a 
positive thing for the Commonwealth? Or is it going to be problematic 
for countries that originally came to join the Commonwealth, and now it 
has evolved from the original association? Because of the Charter, 
there is a whole load of membership criteria which countries didn’t 
originally sign up for?  
 
BM: Well, I think it will do no better than the Charter that we signed at the Summit 
of the Americas many years ago and I don’t know how well that is working in 
Latin America, or within the Caribbean, although we have good governance 
systems, but I don’t know how well it’s working.  I think it’s not worked 
recently in Central America and there are some countries in the Southern 
Cone and other parts of Latin America where it’s not working particularly well. 
It’s like the spirit of the thing, but it doesn’t have power.  But again, charters 
tend to be academic documents.  I don’t know that it would make a big 
difference.  People just have what they consider to be more important and 
urgent priorities to which the Commonwealth does not speak and in fairness, 
never did. Trade is one. 
 
SO: So can you see the Commonwealth limping along, because associations 
don’t tend to die in a spectacular blaze of glory, or disaster? They 
generally become increasingly more redundant, until they’re eventually 
wound up. 
 
BM: Yeah, well we’ve canvassed all those things in the past.  Would the 
Commonwealth do a deliberate downsize? People are doing other things in 
other regions and there’s a cost involved and so on? What do people really 
still want? Do they still want the CPA? The Commonwealth Games, the 
scholarships, the technical assistance, skills transfer?  But again, for a lot of 
these institutions within the Commonwealth, the leadership makes or breaks. 
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I don’t think we’ve had the best leadership in more recent times in several of 
the institutions. 
 
SO: How far do you think the Commonwealth is defined and made by its 
leadership? 
 
BM: I don’t know, I don’t know what the solution is.  I think to decentralise it is not 
going to be a solution.  We’ve looked at that many times.  The whole was an 
attractive aspect; when it met, you were meeting with the whole 
Commonwealth.  You decentralise it then you meet with centres and maybe 
how often then we would be able to afford for the board to come together; 
CHOGMs are now what, every two years? 
 
SO: Yes, and last two and half days. 
 
BM: Right, you might have to go into every five years if you decentralise because 
these things become more and more costly.  I remember in Coolum, it was 
soon after 9/11 and, I forget the name of the Foreign Minister then - he was a 
good friend too - and we stood at this big golf resort, we stood there one day 
and I was saying to him, “You know, we had offered to host 2002” - or 2003, 
whichever it was. Nigeria took it up and went to Abuja which was a total 
disaster. Prime Minister Arthur and I had to sit down and say, “Yes, we’ve 
looked at the numbers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We can’t afford it.”  I 
asked the then Australian minister - I forget his name now - “What is this 
costing you?”  He held my hand and said, “Billie, look up.”  The Queen was in 
a separate location as she always is, but the F-1 11s whatever they are, up 
there, guarding Mr Tony Blair and the Queen and all of the other heads.  “I 
can’t even give voice to the number.”  Barbados would have been small. I had 
my idea of where we would go for the caucus, we don’t have an island 
offshore to go to, or any place. Barbados is so tiny, but I thought I would have 
done something quite exotic and so on and that would please the heads, but 
then I looked at the cost, and I remember Owen and I had to sit down with SG 
G McKinnon and say, “We’re sorry.  Sorry to spoil it - you know, because you 
have to apply years before - but we just are not going to be able to afford 
this.”  The security that we would have had to pay for, for the Heads and 
we’re in small islands, porous coastlines.  We just couldn’t do it and Nigeria 
stepped in and took our slot; and so we never got to host. 
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SO: Were you still foreign minister at the Abuja meeting or had you demitted 
office? 
 
BM: Yes, yes, I was Foreign Minister until I left office in 2008. 
 
SO: Please can I ask you your view of the handling of the Zimbabwe issue? 
 
BM: Mine? Or are you talking about the Caribbean, or the Commonwealth on the 
whole? 
 
SO: The Commonwealth on the whole.  I know about the background of the 
Troika; I’ve interviewed John Howard, and the attempts to encourage 
Zimbabwe to return to the ways of democracy and good governance. 
 
BM: That was never going to happen. 
 
SO: Exactly.  You made mention to PJ Patterson as we were starting talking. 
He chaired that meeting at Abuja, and I just wonder if you remember 
much about the surrounding discussions. 
 
BM: I can remember conversations with individual heads and I wouldn’t like to 
name them.  African heads, one who said to me, “My sister, I have tried. I 
have spoken to this man as best I can.  He’s not listening, he’s not listening to 
us.  He’s not listening to us.”  This was a neighbouring country where people 
were coming across the Limpopo on a daily basis and would either be taken 
back in, like from South Africa by train or trucked in from surrounding 
countries, and who wanted to be helpful, but Mugabe wouldn’t listen to 
anyone. He really does believe that he’s God. He is a megalomaniac. 
 
SO: Patsy Robinson’s view was Robert Mugabe started to suffer from the 
longevity of office: that there is an insidious process of leaders 
surrounding themselves with sycophants. However, these individuals 
also become gatekeepers of information so a leader can start to have a 
very odd view of the world, precisely because they are not getting 
accurate information. Patsy argued there is another process at work, in 
which a leader comes to regard these ‘advisers’ as idiots, and the 
49 
 
accompanying  conviction that the leader has to stay in office, to save 
the country from ‘these people’. Another way of looking at it is more 
malign: in which a leader and his surrounding coterie each need the 
other as protection against eventual prosecution justice for past crimes.  
 
BM: Mugabe virtually decimated an entire tribe. Nobody ever talks about that. 
 
SO: Why did the Commonwealth not talk about the Gukurahundi campaign? 
 
BM: This is it. Nobody ever talks about it. 
 
SO: I have asked two people who were at the Secretariat in the 1980s: “Why 
was this not talked about?”   
 
BM: That has been my question always.  Nobody talks about it.  I never 
understood it, I still don’t understand it.  You may be the only person that I’ve 
ever spoken to who’s taken it on board as an issue.  It was like the great 
unspoken whole herd of elephants in the room, and nobody ever says this 
about them.  
 
SO: One member of International Affairs Division, Moses Anafu’s argument 
was, “You have to understand that newly independent heads are 
particularly sensitive to criticism. So you have to be careful about how 
you introduce a degree of criticism on what might be going on in their 
country.”  Then he also remarked that the information coming out of 
Zimbabwe seemed to be so muddled that they genuinely weren’t sure 
how much of this was South African destabilisation. 
 
BM: I’m not buying any of that. 
 
SO: Certainly South Africa was supporting an element of dissent in 
Matabeleland, so it was a murky picture.  I thought, “But this does not 
absolve…” 
 
BM: No, I’ve never bought into that.  I’ve heard that talk and I don’t like it because 
my impression always is there were other Commonwealth countries where 
there was large-scale genocide. Nigeria was one.  I remember I was a 
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student when they had a civil war.  I remember when Rhodesia first had its 
problem with Ian Smith because I remember a Rhodesian student, who had 
to go back home; they couldn’t afford to keep him there anymore. It broke his 
heart. I never forgot that.  Of course, like students we were doing our thing 
and so on, but this (Gukurahundi) is unspoken and I don’t think I ever will 
understand why that has not been nailed to his forehead.  The kind of 
excuses I’ve heard! I remember one person once said, “You know, when his 
first wife, Sally, died, he turned into a different person”. I said, “Please, 
please, this is a megalomaniac.” 
 
SO: The academic Stephen Chan’s argument is Mugabe hasn’t changed.  
The world around him has changed, but he has not. 
 
BM: And Africa can’t seem to bring him under control.  They could do away with 
apartheid, Mandela could become a president, and Mugabe is 
unmanageable?  And he wears a lot of respect. 
 
SO: Just as a really final point on South Africa, after the end of apartheid in 
1994: how far did you feel South Africa was putting back into the 
Commonwealth? After all the support the ANC had received in terms of 
solidarity, support, diplomatic engagement? 
 
BM: We were excited because Barbados was one of the first countries to take a 
stand against apartheid South Africa.  I remember as a little girl my father 
coming home for dinner, we’d be doing homework and he would be eating his 
dinner and talking to us about all kinds of things.  In those days we used to 
get great round fat bottles with whole spiced peaches from South Africa in 
them and to this day peaches are my favourite fruit.   
 
In summer vacation my mother would get big cans with jams and jellies all 
from South Africa and our Christmas great cake, as we called it, had to be 
set. You started doing that in June and a lot of port from South Africa was 
poured into the jar. My father who was a Member of Parliament at that time 
explained to us that there would be no more of that.  There’d be no more, 
nothing made in South Africa would be brought into this house and that 
Barbados was in solidarity with the movement in South Africa to free South 
Africa from apartheid, and it had to be explained to us and no more peaches.  
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That’s one of my earliest memories.  Barbados was one of the first countries 
to put a trade embargo.  Of course, you’re not helping people in South Africa 
and so on, but that’s what the government of the day did and we felt very 
strongly.  That’s how we were brought up in my generation.  So when 
freedom came eventually and this first election, I was so excited I stayed up 
all night listening to everything.  We thought the world has now found its right 
place and somehow what is happening in South Africa is going to change all 
of Africa and Africa’s going to find its feet, and become very powerful again.  
It didn’t happen. 
 
SO: The tragedy is, of course, that excitement and great change in South 
Africa was happening, at the same time that genocide was happening in 
Rwanda. 
 
BM: Indeed, Rwanda’s done very well though. Incredibly well. 
 
SO: So, on South Africa then, there were great hopes that South Africa 
would be put back into the Commonwealth? 
 
BM: Yes, and we thought it was going to do… great things would happen and 
then… 
 
SO: It didn’t materialise? 
 
BM: No, it was taking a long time, but I well remember when President Mandela 
was invited by our heads to come to one of our CARICOM Heads’ meetings.  
It was in Soufriere in St Lucia and again they invited me into their caucus with 
him, and he said to them… I’ll never forget it, he said to them, “You’re so 
fortunate in these islands where you live.  Do you know what is my greatest 
concern about my country?  Clean water.”  Clean water!  Here you have to 
just pump it up and drink it! He spoke about pollution up-stream in many of 
the big rivers.  He said, “You would think it looks as though we have such 
tremendous natural resources, but you know the mining industry has caused 
poisons in the water.” He said that in terms of basic infrastructure and so on, 
there’s so much work to be done. I felt, overwhelmed.  I said, “Oh my 
goodness. I thought they were at least where we were at, but we’re small 
islands seeing things in microcosm.  But that was his great fear and concern, 
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harnessing natural resources and putting basic infrastructure in place. And 
then of course the first time I went to Cape Town and saw the townships 
there, I had a better understanding of what he was talking about.  I think that 
the South African position on HIV/AIDS upset a lot of people in the Caribbean 
because we are second only to Sub-Sahara Africa in terms of our HIV/AIDS 
prevalence. 
  
SO: I was reading before I came here about your HIV/Aids work, and 
promotion of sex and health education.  
 
BM: There you go. I think we’ve covered all our bases. I wanted to say something 
positive though about Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association, 
and the Lawyers Association. They are two separate associations, but I ask 
questions of a judge who is a dear friend and who is very much engaged in 
both of these associations and his comment was that these organisations 
were among the best in the Commonwealth, particularly in terms of technical 
assistance, skills transfer, some elements being available on websites.  
Commonwealth managed trips and Judges’ Association meetings can be very 
useful and he thought especially to African judges. The Commonwealth 
Lawyers Association, he says - and I trust his judgment implicitly - is more like 
a professional body, not unlike the International Bar Association and other 
such associations.  In time it might be overtaken by people going to other 
associations with a wider breadth than the Commonwealth.  Small states, we 
talked about that: scholarships are important, technology transfer, bilateral 
agreements, but the special and differential treatment that we used to get is 
declining too, and that has to do with the availability of money. Trade and 
investment relations, economic development, generally speaking.  Although I 
can’t speak with too much particularity on those things. 
 
SO: Did you have a view on the Visa Project?  I know that there had been a 
suggestion by the Ramphal Institute, of an idea to see whether 
Commonwealth businessmen who could get speedy, easier visa access 
to Commonwealth countries?  
 
BM: I think that’s been overtaken by the fact that there are so many other ways 
that you can do that, and there are different countries that are doing different 
things. But I am not well up on that at all. There are things that are open to us 
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in the Caribbean: there is access to the Inter-American Development Bank, 
the World Bank, the IMF, EU, ACP.  The Commonwealth, because of its 
structure, cannot be very helpful to us on those issues and the economic 
issues are of maximum significance in these opening decades of the 21st 
Century.  This was one where I thought that… [looking through papers.] No, I 
was saying here that with the lesser influence of the SGs, the changeover of 
the Secretariat, the voice of the Commonwealth is too muted now in the 
international community, too often invisible on exclusive Commonwealth 
issues of importance and more so on non-Commonwealth international or 
global issues by definition.  You don’t hear the word “Commonwealth”. The 
Commonwealth connection is not the connection that is made, but you asked 
too about CMAG and Latimer House Principles. There are new constructs of 
legislation emerging that are taking their initiatives from countries other than 
Commonwealth countries.  Less and less the sphere of influence.   
 
In countries like ours in the Caribbean where our legislative and governance 
processes are still in good name, the Commonwealth remains the 
overarching body to which we would look first for guidance. Still they hold on 
to Commonwealth practices and principles.  Commonwealth meetings are of 
lesser importance now, because there are speciality areas and other places 
to which one goes to meetings with a wider than Commonwealth 
membership.  So I think some of those meetings are becoming smaller, some 
are disappearing. 
 
SO: Yes, and the very fact that the Secretariat is dramatically diminished in 
size, that they can’t provide the technical assistance and research 
facilities in the way that it did before. 
 
BM: I’ve always thought that we have good people at the Secretariat. I am not 
sure since the era of the Chief and Don McKinnon.  I don’t know what’s going 
to happen.  In fact, unless they really make an excellent choice for SG, this 
may be the beginning of the end. 
 
SO: Well, there’s a lot riding on this Malta summit coming up in late 
October/November 2015.   
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BM: It could make or break the Commonwealth. The Caribbean is divided and 
they may well find that some other region may put a name forward. 
 
SO: Billie, very many thanks for such a wide ranging discussion. I am very 
grateful indeed.  
 
